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During the 1976-1977 term,I the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit remained in the forefront of developments in securities
law. This article will focus on three areas in which the Seventh Circuit
handed down significant securities decisions. These are: (1) the definitions
of "security," with particular emphasis upon the Seventh Circuit's decision
in Daniel v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters ;2 (2) the development
of a standard of "recklessness" sufficient to satisfy the requirement of
scienter under the anti-fraud provisions of the securities acts imposed by the
Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder; 3 and (3) the
appropriate measure of damages in merger cases involving a violation of
section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as set forth in Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co. 4 In addition, this article will discuss various securi-
ties cases from the Seventh Circuit which do not fall into the above three
areas, but which nonetheless are worthy of note.
THE DEFINITION OF "SECURITY"
DANIEL V. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS
Perhaps the most far-reaching decision of the Seventh Circuit in the
securities field during the 1976-1977 term was Daniel v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters,5 in which the court held that an employee's
interest in a pension plan was a "security" for purposes of the securities
acts, and thus subject to the acts' anti-fraud provisions.
6
The facts of Daniel are relatively straightforward. Plaintiff was a
member of Union Local 705 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
He had been an employee of Local 705 since April of 1950, and had worked
* Partner, Mayer, Brown & Platt; Attorney, Division of Corporate Finance, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 1961-1965; LL.M., Georgetown University; LL.B., University of
Notre Dame.
** Associate, Mayer, Brown & Platt; J.D., University of Notre Dame.
1. This article will discuss decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
which were published between the summer of 1976 and the fall of 1977.
2. 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977) cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3526 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1978)(No.
77-753).
3. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
4. 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3293 (U.S., Oct. 1, 1977) (No. 77-
331).
5. 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 77q(a) (1970).
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continuously as a truck driver with Local 705 from April 1950, to November
1973, except for a brief four-month involuntary lay-off from December
1960, until April 1961. 7 Plaintiff learned of Local 705's pension fund in
1955, and considered the pension fund to be a material factor in his
continuing employment with Local 705 "covered employers," i.e., em-
ployers who, pursuant to labor contracts negotiated by the Teamsters, make
set payments into pension funds for Teamster members in partial con-
sideration for services performed by those union members in the course of
their employment and in lieu of wages. 8 None of the communications
plaintiff received over the course of his 22-year service with Local 705
covered employers dispelled his expectation of receiving retirement benefits
from the pension fund. 9 After his retirement, plaintiff was informed that the
four-month temporary lay-off in 1960-1961 rendered him ineligible for
pension benefits under the "break in service" rule contained in the plan. 
10
The plaintiff then brought an action against Local 705, the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, and certain other Teamster union locals with
pension funds on behalf of all members of all affiliated locals of the
Teamsters who had "purchased and acquired an interest in a Teamsters'
pension fund." "
In his complaint, plaintiff asserted that defendants had both misrepre-
sented and omitted material facts concerning the value of a union member's
interest in the pension fund. Specifically, the complaint alleged that state-
ments concerning the length and continuity provisions of the vesting re-
quirements of the plan were misleading, and constituted material misrepre-
sentations. 12 As concerns the material omissions, the plaintiff's complaint
alleged they consisted of (1) failure to inform members that unless the length
and continuity requirements of the vesting provisions were satisfied they
would receive no benefits, and previous employer-paid contributions would
be forfeited; (2) failure to disclose the arbitrary nature of the plan's actuarial
basis; (3) failure to disclose the actuarial likelihood that a union member
would receive any pension benefits whatsoever; and (4) failure to state that
defendants had arbitrarily diverted pension funds for the benefit of persons
other than members of the union locals.
13
7. 561 F.2d at 1227.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. The Local 705 pension fund had a twenty year vesting period. If a member did not
meet this length of service requirement, his entire contribution paid into the trust fund for him
by his employer or employers would be forfeited. Moreover, Local 705's pension plan required
continuous service with covered employers. A violation of this "break in service" rule also
resulted in a forfeiture of all pension benefits. 561 F.2d at 1227-28.
II. Id. at 1225.
12. Id. at 1226.
13. Id. at 1226-27.
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In the district court, the defendants filed motions seeking dismissal of
the action on grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to
state a claim. Judge Kirkland denied these motions and held that the anti-
fraud provisions of the securities acts were applicable to union members'
interests in local pension funds.' 4 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit, in a
lengthy opinion by Judge Cummings, affirmed Judge Kirkland's denial of
the motion to dismiss, and held that the complaint alleged the sale of a
security for purposes of application of the anti-fraud provisions of the
securities acts. 15
Providing an overview of his opinion, Judge Cummings stated, in the
order of their importance, the relevant factors in determining whether
plaintiff's interest in the pension fund constituted the sale of a security:
Analysis begins with the relevant statutes themselves. After a
study of their language and any court-added gloss, attention shifts
to the statutes' legislative history. Additional considerations
weigh in the balance. The history of the SEC's administration of
the securities laws often can add a substantive gloss of its own
which is entitled to the usual administrative deference. . . so long
as it does not become law-making . . . .And to the extent that
these more cogent interpretive tools are not dispositive of the
statutes' meaning, additional considerations of policy may tip the
scales. . . .We shall use this methodology in our analysis of the
case. 16
In accordance with Judge Cummings' proposed method of analysis, the
first important inquiry to be resolved was whether the employee's interest in
the pension fund was a security as defined by: (1) relevant statutory lan-
guage; and (2) the relevant case law interpreting and applying such lan-
guage. The defendant-employer asserted that a union member's interest in a
pension fund was not a "security" as that term is defined in section 2(1) of
the Securities Act of 1933,17 and in section 3(a)(10) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.18 The court of appeals, however, found that such an
interest constitutes an "investment contract" as that term is used in both
definitions of the word "security."' 19
Referring to the definition of investment contract outlined by the
14. 410 F. Supp. 541, 547 (1976).
15. 561 F.2d at 1244.
16. Id. at 1229.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(I) (1970).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970).
19. The court stressed that in defining the word "security", two principles were im-
portant: first, the remedial nature of the securities laws, and the consequent necessity for their
broad construction; and second, that in attempting to define the term "security" economic
reality should be given preference to the form by which a particular interest is denominated. 561
F.2d at 1230-31.
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Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. ,20 the court stated that an
investment contract is
a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profit solely
from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being immate-
rial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal
certificates or by nominal interests in the enterprise.
21
The court found that all of the elements of the Howey test were satisfied in
the case of a union member's interest in a pension trust fund. Judge
Cummings stated that a union member was clearly an investor with respect
to the fund, noting that employer contributions to a pension fund are simply
a part of an employee's total compensation package and that such contribu-
tions constitute "putting money into a fund for an employee's future use
which he would otherwise be getting in his paycheck." 22 Judge Cummings
rejected arguments by certain defendants that the contingent nature of the
employee's expectation with respect to pension benefits rendered nugatory
any interest such an employee may have in the fund. In the court's opinion,
"mere contingent expectancies are the rule rather than the exception in the
equity markets" 23 and "a right to receive benefits, received as a form of
compensation and not subject to unilateral withdrawal by the pension trustee
or the employer, is a sufficient interest to constitute a security, even though
it will only mature upon the happening of certain events in the future.' '24
The court also had little difficulty finding that the trust fund constituted a
"common enterprise" under Howey, ruling that a trust fund (in which union
members had an undivided interest), which invests in the capital markets
was a common enterprise, despite the fact that a union member could not
transfer his interest.25
The final requirement of the Howey test is that the common enterprise
generate profits. 26 Defendants in Daniel contended that this element had not
been satisfied. In the case of United Housing Federation, Inc. v. Forman ,27
the Supreme Court defined profits to mean either "capital appreciation
resulting from the development of the initial investment" or "a participation
20. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
21. 561 F.2d at 1231 (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 298-99 (1946)). The
court of appeals also cited the restatement of the Howey rule contained in United Housing
Federation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975): "The touchstone is the presence of an
investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived
from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others."
22. 561 F.2d at 1232.
23. Id. at 1233.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
27. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
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in earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds."- 28 Applying the
Forman definition of profit to the facts of Daniel, Judge Cummings noted
the obvious fact that "the expected payout to a beneficiary [under a pension
plan] will exceed the contributions made by the employer on the employee's
behalf (the union member's investment). The resulting gain would
commonly be termed a profit." ' 29 Since a substantial portion of that gain
would be attributable to the union member's investment, 30 the Forman
definition of profit-and the final element of the Howey test-was met.
After analyzing the union member's interest in his pension plan under a
literal application of the Howey test, Judge Cummings stressed that such an
interest must also be a security in economic reality.3' In this regard, Judge
Cummings noted that pension funds were remarkably similar to mutual
funds. 32 Both funds represented a "pool of money" invested for the benefit
of the mutual fund shareholder or union member by the pension fund or
mutual fund manager. In addition, in both cases the amount of the payout to
the shareholder or union member depends upon the money management
skill of the fund managers. Judge Cummings also analogized a union
member's interest in his pension fund to a variable annuity contract, which
has long been held to be a security under the securities acts. 33 These factors
led Judge Cummings to the conclusion that a union member's "interest in
the fund embodies many of the significant characteristics typically present in
the instruments concededly covered by the securities act."
'34
In addition to the language of the statutes and case interpretation, the
Seventh Circuit also found support for its holding in the legislative history
and SEC interpretations of the securities acts. Judge Cummings noted the
rejection of a proposed 1934 Senate amendment to the Securities Act of
1933,35 which would have exempted from registration an offering made
solely to employees of an issuer in connection with a bona fide plan for the
payment of extra compensation. 36 The reason why this proposed amendment
had been rejected in conference was the need to protect participants in such
plans who "may be in as great need of protection afforded by availability of
information concerning the issuer for which they work as are most other
28. Id. at 852.
29. 561 F.2d at 1234.
30. The court acknowledged a portion of the gain would also derive from non-investment
sources such as the "pooled" contributions of all participating employers and the forfeitures of
employees who had failed to satisfy various vesting and other requirements of the plan. Id.




35. Hereinafter referred to in the text as the 1933 Act.
36. 561 F.2d at 1237.
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members of the public." 37 Judge Cummings also found support in the fact
that Congress, by specifically exempting pension funds that are maintained
by a bank or by an insurance company in a separate account from the
registration requirements of the 1933 Act 38 and the reporting requirements
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 39 had evidenced its agreement with
the SEC's position that interests in pension funds are securities. In the
Seventh Circuit's view, the "1970 Amendments show that Congress in-
tended to conform the 1933 Act to the SEC's administrative view that,
although interests in pension funds did not need to be registered in most
cases, they are nonetheless securities." 
40
Finally, Judge Cummings turned to the policies behind the securities
acts for further support of the proposition that union members' interests in
pension funds are securities. Perhaps the most crucial factors which influ-
enced the Seventh Circuit to find these interests in pension funds to be
securities were the amount of money controlled by such funds, the number
of union members with an interest in such funds, and the tremendous role
played by pension funds in the capital markets. 4 1 The court noted that by
1962, 83% of invested capital was invested indirectly and that pensions
constituted 27% of this amount.42 Moreover, the asset value of pension
plans has exceeded the combined total accumulated by mutual funds, life
insurance companies, and property and liability insurance companies.
43
Judge Cummings succinctly summarized the relevant policy considerations:
Because employee pension plans are now the major, if not
sole, form of investment for most American workers to provide
for their old age and because of the now crucial role that such
plans play in today's capital markets, they are just the sort of
investment vehicle that the securities acts were passed to regulate.
To proclaim that the securities laws encompass securities consist-
ing of interests in pension plans is "quite consistent with the
congressional enactment and with the role of the federal judiciary
37. Id. at 1238 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934)).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2)(A) (1970).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1970) [hereinafter referred to in the text as the 1934 Act].
40. 561 F.2d at 1241.
41. As Judge Cummings stated:
Because of favorable tax provisions and economies of scale, pension funds are the
most efficient way for an employee to invest . . . . On a relative scale, his pension
plan will probably be a Teamster member's largest investment. On an aggregate basis
private pension funds control a huge amount of the capital markets. At the end of
1972, they held 11% in value of all New York Stock Exchange listed stocks and in the
same year they accounted for over 23% of the dollar value of all shares traded there. If
the sole investment vehicles for tens of millions of Americans which in the aggregate
control a quarter or more of the entire capital market are exempt from the anti-fraud
provisions of the securities laws, then policing of the capital markets is significantly
neutralized.
Id. at 1237.
42. Id. at 1241.
43. Such plans currently have book value assets of $216.9 billion. Id.
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in interpreting it" . . . . The type of fraud allegedly perpetrated
on the plaintiff is among those the securities laws were passed to
prevent and remedy.4
Having determined that plaintiff's interest constituted a security, the
Seventh Circuit then held that that interest had been acquired in a "sale."
Turning to the definitions of "sale" in the 1933 and 1934 Acts, Judge
Cummings stated that:
a "sale" of an interest in a pension fund depends upon whether
there has been a disposition of it. Here plaintiff acquired an
interest in the Local 705 Pension Fund, and as shown, that interest
is a security. Therefore, there necessarily has been a disposition
of a security to plaintiff within the scope of the two Acts.
45
Although Judge Cummings reasoned that the compulsory nature of the
employer contributions did not affect this conclusion because the definition
of "sale" in the securities acts does not require volition, 46 a volitional
element was nonetheless involved in the "sale" of such interests since
union members voted whether to ratify collective bargaining contracts
containing pension fund provisions.4 7 Moreover, the court observed that an
employee's decision to remain employed by covered employers "results in
his continuing to give value in the future and in the further acquisition of
interests in the pension fund."
48
Once the court had established that the plaintiff's interest in a pension
fund constituted a security that had been acquired in a sale, it had ao
difficulty in finding that section 17(a) of the 1933 Act4 9 created a private
44. Id. at 1241-42 (citation omitted).
45. Id. at 1242. As Judge Cummings noted, the 1933 Act requires that any sale of a
security be "for value." However, the court found that an employee's services given in
exchange for his employer's contributions to the pension fund constitute value. Id.
46. Id. at 1243.
47. Id.
48. Id. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the SEC's rejection of that agency's prior
position that no sales were involved in non-contributory plans because the employer's contribu-
tion was considered a gift. The court noted that this position was
no longer viable even as to the registration provisions because non-contributory
pensions are no longer viewed as a mere gift. Even though the Commission had in the
past applied a no-sale rule to pension trusts as to the registration requirements of the
1933 Act, that rule was not administratively and should not be judicially applied to the
anti-fraud provisions of both Acts.
Id.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970) provides that:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(]) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
504
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cause of action under the facts of the Daniel case. Although defendants
argued that section 17(a) was concerned with the initial issuance of securi-
ties and that only the 1934 Act was relevant with respect to the resale
market, the court ruled that once a section 10(b) 50 claim had been estab-
lished, there was little point in denying a cause of action under section
17(a). 51 In a footnote, Judge Cummings conceptualized the securities distri-
bution process involved in a pension fund:
Here the security is plaintiff's interest in the pension plan. These
interests generically arose when the pension plan was first formed
for the benefit of Local 705 members. This was the primary
distribution of the securities. Since Daniel was a member of Local
705 at this time, he has standing to sue for fraud in the primary
distribution under Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. Each year Daniel
paid more value into the fund and from time to time plan amend-
ments were effected which Daniel claims contributed to his being
defrauded. This is the conceptual predicate for finding a second-
ary distribution under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.
52
The final issue resolved by the Daniel court was whether the provisions
of ERISA 53 preempted the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities
laws with respect to their applicability to pension funds .5 The court ob-
served that since those anti-fraud provisions were demonstrably applicable
to such interests, "preemption may only be declared in the face of an
explicit repealer provision or the most cogent repugnancy between the
securities and pension regulatory schemes." 5 5 Judge Cummings determined
that these standards had not been met.
Judge Cummings first observed that ERISA itself contained a general
savings clause which provided that nothing in that act was to be construed as
a repeal of any federal or state statutes. 56 Any preemption claim, the court
ruled, was based on a confusion between the registration requirements of the
securities acts and their anti-fraud provisions. With respect to the latter, the
court stressed that "the anti-fraud provisions do not establish an affirmative
disclosure system requiring the filing of documents. Rather the anti-fraud
provisions are essentially a generalized self-executing prohibition against
fraudulent activity. There is no invitation 'to create a federal common law
governing the management of pension plans.' "57 With this understanding,
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
51. 561 F.2d at 1245.
52. Id. at 1246 n.46.
53. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (Supp. IV
1974).
54. 561 F.2d at 1246.
55. Id.
56. Section 1144(d) provides that "[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter,
amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States . or any rule
or regulation issued under any such law." 29 U.S.C. § I 144(d) (Supp. IV 1974).
57. 561 F.2d at 1247.
505
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the provisions of ERISA and the anti-fraud provisions of the securities acts
could be read in a complementary manner:
Reading the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws to be
complementary to the requirements of ERISA makes good sense.
The requirements of ERISA do not substitute for the protections
afforded by the anti-fraud provisions because the securities laws
require that all material facts, including, of course, risk of loss, be
disclosed prior to the investment decision . . . while ERISA dis-
closure limits itself to the plan provisions without a particularizing
of how or how likely benefits may be lost . . . and may be made
90 days subsequent to the investment commitment.
5 8
Thus, the anti-fraud provisions of the securities acts protect an investor prior
to making an investment decision, while ERISA protects "employees who
have been employed for a substantial period of time at a job covered by a
pension plan, protecting them from losing benefits through ignorance of the
plan provisions." 
59
In conclusion, Judge Cummings carefully circumscribed the scope of
the Daniel opinion:
[W]e wish to emphasize that we are not holding the registration
requirements of the 1933 Act or the reporting requirements of the
1934 Act to be applicable to these pension funds. We do not
require the filing of any document or establish judicial control
over pension fund operations. There should be no undue burden
caused by the type of disclosure the anti-fraud provisions would
encourage because all of the material information will be readily
available to the plan trustees since their actuaries needed all the
information in order to set up the plan in the first place.
Moreover, plan liability, given the fact that employees' inter-
ests in pension funds are covered by the anti-fraud provisions of
the securities acts, is still limited by a number of factors. Particu-
lar employees must show, in light of all the ambient circum-
stances, justifiable reliance on a material misrepresentation or
omission causing him injury. If all material facts are disclosed in a
manner comprehensible to the average worker, as in any other
securities fraud case, no damage causation will exist under the
securities laws.
6°
Judge Tone filed a separate concurring opinion in Daniel, stating that
"for me, this is a close and difficult case" 6 1 and that "the series of
transactions by which Daniel acquired his interest or expectancy, such as it
58. Id. at 1248.
59. Id. at 1249. The Daniel court also dismissed as specious arguments that affirmance of
Judge Kirkland's decision would undermine a union's authority as exclusive bargaining agent
for its employees, holding instead that "application of the antifraud provisions of the securities
laws should enhance federal labor policy by augmenting the unchallenged statutory right of
workers to be fairly represented by their union. Id. at 1249-50.
60. Id. at 1250-51.
61. Id. at 1251 (Tone, J., concurring).
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was, do not fit neatly into the traditional concept of a sale of a security." 62
Judge Tone also criticized the SEC for what he considered a recent change
in position on the question of whether a union member's acquisition of an
interest in a pension fund involved the sale of a security, remarking that:
[a]s late as 1971 in its Institutional Investors Study submitted to
Congress in connection with the consideration of the ERISA legis-
lation, the Commission's view was that although a noncontribu-
tory pension plan might well be an investment contract, the ele-
ment of sale was lacking. Before that not even the existence of a
security was acknowledged.
63
Judge Tone concluded, however, that while Congress could be con-
sidered as having acquiesced in the SEC's prior view as to the status of
interests in pension funds as securities, that fact alone did not preclude a
judicial finding that such interests were securities and thus subject to the
anti-fraud provisions of the securities acts.
64
The Daniel decision does resolve one difficult question left open by
Judge Kirkland's decision in the district court, i.e., whether pension plans
such as that involved in Daniel are subject to the registration requirements
of the 1933 Act. The Seventh Circuit emphatically held that they are not.
Nonetheless, the Daniel opinion raises other problems.
One is precisely what items are material and therefore need to be
disclosed to union members in connection with pension plans. Clearly, the
Seventh Circuit attached great importance to the actuarial possibility of a
member's eventually receiving any pension benefits; Judge Cummings
mentions that factor several times in his opinion. More particularly, such
matters as the vesting period and any rules comparable to the "break in
service" rule involved in Daniel clearly require disclosure, as would any
forfeiture provisions in connection with those rules. However, the Seventh
Circuit was clearly not creating an exclusive list of disclosure items which
would satisfy in all cases all the requirements of the anti-fraud provisions.
Another issue left open by the Daniel court is the mechanism by which
the required disclosure is to be made. Although the registration requirements
of the 1933 Act 65 are not applicable in such cases, some type of disclosure
document must be distributed to union members explaining in readily




64. Id. at 1252.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1970).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
SCIENTER IN THE POST-HOCHFELDER ERA
One of several questions left open by the Supreme Court's decision in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder66 was whether reckless conduct amounting to a
willful disregard for the truth satisfies the requirement of scienter necessary
to establish a violation of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act 61 and rule lOb-5 68
thereunder, thus giving rise to a private cause of action for damages. 69 The
Seventh Circuit has clearly answered this question in the affirmative and has
attempted to fashion a standard of "recklessness" which is the equivalent of
scienter.
Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc. ,70 decided during the Seventh Circuit's
1975-76 term and shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Hochfelder,
indicated that the Seventh Circuit would consider recklessness to be suffi-
cient to satisfy the scienter requirement in certain cases. In Bailey, the
Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's finding that defendant, Continen-
tal Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, was guilty of
violating rule lOb-5 on the grounds that it was "grossly negligent" in failing
to recognize the unfairness of an asset transfer by a corporation it controlled
as executor of an estate and was "blinded by a conflict of interest" causing
it to "wantonly ignore evidence of the unfairness of [the] securities transac-
tion to the corporation." 7 While Judge Bryan stated that this decision was
consistent with Hochfelder,72 the Bailey court did not articulate a standard
of recklessness sufficient to meet the scienter requirement. Moreover, the
decision to impose rule lOb-5 liability was heavily influenced by the fact
that, as a controlling stockholder, Continental stood in a fiduciary relation-
ship to plaintiff and, thus, had "the obligation to disclose to the other
stockholders information in its possession which reflects on the fairness of
the transaction. 
7 3
66. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). In Hochfelder, the Court held that a private cause of action for
damages under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule lOb-5 thereunder
requires an allegation of scienter on the part of the defendant.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
68. 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1977).
69. In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court mentioned the possibility that recklessness might,
in certain cases, in and of itself, amount to scienter:
In this opinion the term "scienter" refers to a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered
to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act. We
need not address here the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior
is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
70. 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976).
71. Id. at 993.
72. Judge Bryan simply stated Hochfelder contained "nothing to the contrary," referring
to footnote 12 of the Supreme Court's opinion. Id. at 994 n.14.
73. Id. at 993.
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During the past term, Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp.74
further refined the recklessness standard intimated in Bailey. In Sund-
strand, the plaintiff was engaged in merger negotiations with Standard
Kollsman Industries, Inc. 75 As a part of those negotiations, and in an effort
to prevent Sun Chemical from acquiring a block of SKI stock large enough
to thwart a Sundstrand/SKI merger before Sundstrand could complete its
study of SKI, Sundstrand agreed to purchase a stock option for approxi-
mately 200,000 shares of SKI held by Huarisa, the chairman of SKI. Under
the terms of the stock option and the agreement between Sundstrand and
Huarisa with respect to its purchase, Sundstrand was to reimburse Huarisa
for his payment of 5% of the purchase price of the 200,000 shares76 and to
pay the $6,000,000 balance of the purchase price to the family of the
founder of SKI, which owned the shares subject to the option. 7
After Sundstrand had an opportunity to review the operations of SKI, it
broke off merger discussions, but announced that it would honor its
"commitment" to purchase the remaining shares of stock covered by the
agreement with Huarisa. After making this $6,000,000 payment, Sund-
strand sued Sun Chemical (which had in the meantime acquired SKI) and
Meers, a managing partner of White, Weld & Co., which had acted as
merger broker in connection with the Sundstrand/SK negotiations, alleging
violations of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 entitling it to recover payments
made pursuant to the agreement with Huarisa.
Judge Cummings, who was joined by Judges Swygert and Fairchild in
a unanimous decision, had little difficulty in holding that the material
misstatements of Huarisa and other SKI personnel in connection with the
merger negotiations violated rule lOb-5 and satisfied the scienter require-
ment set forth in Hochfelder. The court found that Huarisa and other SKI
personnel had not only misstated the earnings of SKI, and had given
misleading per share earnings projections, but had also failed to disclose a
dissident director's report that questioned certain accounting practices of
SKI with respect to deferral of preproduction costs and nonrecognition of
certain losses. The court also found that Huarisa and other SKI personnel
had not disclosed an independent report of the accounting firm of Ernst &
Ernst prepared at the request of the dissident SKI director that also criticized
SKI's accounting practices.
78
74. 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3182 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No.
77-255).
75. Hereinafter referred to in the text and footnotes as SKI.
76. This was accomplished by Sundstrand's transfer to Huarisa of 5,686 shares of its
common stock.
77. 553 F.2d at 1037.
78. The opinion is not particularly clear as to the standard used in finding scienter in the
case of Huarisa and SKI. Judge Cummings states that the misrepresentations were made
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The more interesting holding in Sundstrand, however, is that Meers,
as merger broker, was also liable under rule lOb-5 for the injury suffered by
Sundstrand in view of his failure to disclose reports by the dissident director
and Ernst & Ernst. Judge Cummings stressed that, although he was an SKI
director, Meers occupied a quasi-fiduciary relationship to Sundstrand be-
cause he was also a member of an investment banking firm which had
performed services for that corporation. Therefore, "Meers had an affirma-
tive common law duty to disclose material facts relating to the proposed
merger," ,79 in express contrast to the lack of any such duty owed by Ernst &
Ernst to the plaintiffs in Hochfelder.
Since the district court had decided Meers' culpability without refer-
ence to Hochfelder, the Seventh Circuit felt obliged to make an independent
finding as to whether his conduct was sufficiently reckless to satisfy the
scienter requirement. 80 In an effort to ascertain the point at which reckless
conduct amounts to scienter, Judge Cummings first interpreted the Bailey
decision to mean that "a reckless omission of material facts upon which the
plaintiff put justifiable reliance in connection with a sale or purchase of
securities is actionable under section 10(b) as fleshed out by rule lOb-5."81
He then adopted the definition of recklessness formulated in Franke v.
Midwestern Oklahoma Development Authority :82
[R]eckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable omis-
sion, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence,
but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and
which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is
either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must
have been aware of it.8
3
Judge Cummings interpreted this definition of recklessness to create a two-
pronged test consisting of an "objective" element, i.e., the danger of
misleading buyers must be actually known or so obvious that any reasonable
man would be legally bound as knowing, and a "subjective" element, i.e.,
the failure to disclose must be due to something more than even "white
heart/empty head" good faith or inexcusable negligence. Under this test,
recklessness could be considered "the functional equivalent of intent.' 84
intentionally or recklessly and that the district court had not erred "in using the 'reckless'
alternative in assessing Huarisa's liability...." Id. at 1040.
79. Id. at 1043.
80. The need to make such a finding was even greater because Meers' conduct consisted
of reckless nondisclosure, rather than disclosure with a reckless disregard for the truth of the
matter disclosed.
81. 553 F.2d at 1044.
82. 428 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
83. Id. at 725 (cited in 553 F.2d at 1045).
84. 553 F.2d at 1045.
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Applying this two-pronged test to Meers' conduct, the Seventh Circuit
first held that the objective element of the Franke test had been satisfied.
Meers had not only participated in merger negotiations in which the earnings
figures had been discussed, but also had been familiar with the reports of
both the dissident director and Ernst & Ernst. Under these circumstances,
the court concluded, any reasonable man would realize the danger of
misleading Sundstrand through the failure to disclose the information known
to Meers.85 The court then held that the subjective element of the Franke
recklessness test was also satisfied. Meers was present at a board meeting of
SKI when the dissident director asked if Sundstrand had been informed of
his report and the Ernst & Ernst criticisms of SKI's accounting practices at
any timeduring the merger negotiations. In response to this inquiry, Huarisa
stated that Sundstrand had not been so informed. Under these circum-
stances, Judge Cummings stated, "Meers must have consciously decided
not to disclose (and did not disclose) the substance of the reports to
Sundstrand. "86 Since Meers was thus chargeable with knowledge that the
nondisclosure would pose a material danger to plaintiff and made a con-
scious decision not to disclose such information, his conduct amounted to
reckless nondisclosure satisfying the scienter requirement of rule lOb-5.87
The next decision discussing the recklessness standard was Sanders v.
John Nuveen & Co. 8 8 Sanders involved a class action on behalf of pur-
chasers of short-term notes underwritten by defendant John Nuveen & Co. 89
When the case was last before the Seventh Circuit in 1975, 90 the court
affirmed the judgment of the district court and held that "an underwriter of
short-term commercial paper who acted in the mistaken but honest belief
that financial statements prepared by certified public accountants correctly
85. Id. at 1047.
86. Id. at 1047-48.
87. Id. at 1048-49. Although Sundstrand was thus victorious on its lOb-5 claim, the
decision of the Seventh Circuit effectively negated the district court's award of damages to
Sundstrand. The Seventh Circuit held that Sundstrand's payment of the remaining 95% of the
purchase price of the 200,000 shares subject to its stock option transfer agreement with Huarisa
was made upon erroneous legal advice as to the necessity for such payment, and at a time when
it already had knowledge of most, if not all, of the material misrepresentations and omissions of
the defendants in the course of the merger negotiations. As a result, the court held that
defendants were not liable for the $6,000,000 balance of the purchase price of the shares, since
the chain of causation had been broken by both Sundstrand's knowledge and the erroneous
legal advice it received. Id. at 1051.
88. 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977).
89. Plaintiffs asserted claims under, inter alia, section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule lOb-5
thereunder, sections 12(2) and 17 of the 1933 Act, and Rule 27 of the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. See text accompanying notes 89-106 infra.
90. 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated, 425 U.S. 929 (1976). The Sanders case had
been before the Seventh Circuit on an earlier occasion. In its first Sanders decision, Sanders v.
John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972), the
Seventh Circuit held that such short-term notes were "securities" within the definition of the
1934 Act.
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represented the condition of the issuer" was liable under rule lOb-5 to its
customers for losses sustained as a result of the issuer's default. 91 In short,
the decision held that the underwriter's negligence was actionable under rule
lOb-5.
The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Seventh Circuit in
Sanders and remanded the case for consideration in the light of Hochfel-
der.92 In its decision on remand, the Seventh Circuit noted that although
Hochfelder, in determining that rule lOb-5 required a finding of scienter,
had left open the question of whether reckless conduct was sufficient to
constitute scienter, the opinions in Bailey and Sundstrand had settled the
question in the affirmative. Judge Wood, however, drew more careful
restrictions around the recklessness test than had Judge Cummings in Sund-
strand:
In view of the Supreme Court's analysis in Hochfelder of the
statutory scheme of implied private remedies and express reme-
dies, the definition of "reckless behavior" should not be a liberal
one lest any discernible distinction between "scienter" and "neg-
ligence" be obliterated for these purposes. We believe "reckless"
in these circumstances comes closer to being a lesser form of
intent than merely a greater degree of ordinary negligence. We
perceive it to be not just a difference in degree, but also in kind.
93
The court then held that there was no evidence at trial that "[Nuveen's] acts
of commission or omission were reckless, that is, that they were so highly
unreasonable and such an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary
care as to present a danger of misleading the plaintiff to the extent that the
danger was either known to the defendant or so obvious that the defendant
must have been aware of it."94
In addition to the issue involving the degree of recklessness necessary
to constitute scienter for rule 1Ob-5 purposes, the Seventh Circuit also
considered other issues presented by the case but not specifically mentioned
in the Supreme Court's mandate on vacation of its initial decision. The first
issue was whether the judgment of the district court could be sustained under
section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. 95 Although the language of section 17(a)
parallels that of rule lOb-5, it has been argued that the Hochfelder decision
would not necessarily dictate a scienter requirement in a section 17(a) action
because the "misstatements and omissions" language of section 17(a)(2) is
not qualified by any traditional fraud language, while the Supreme Court in
91. 524 F.2d at 1066.
92. 425 U.S. 929 (1976). Upon remand, the defendants filed a motion in the court of
appeals seeking summary reversal of the district court's judgment.
93. 554 F.2d at 793.
94. Id.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1970). For the text of this provision see note 49 supra.
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Hochifelder had emphasized the presence of fraud concepts in section 10(b)
and had stressed that since rule 1Ob-5 had been adopted pursuant to that
section it was qualified by those underlying concepts.
96
Although Judge Wood discussed the disputed question of whether a
private right of action may be maintained under section 17(a), he found no
need to resolve this issue because "even if such a private cause of action
does exist under section 17(a), it would require proof of scienter." 91 In so
holding, the Sanders opinion relied upon the Supreme Court's discussion in
Hochfelder of the express provisions for civil liability premised upon
negligent wrongdoing contained in sections 11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act98
and the consequent implication that section 10(b) of the 1934 Act required
more than negligent misrepresentation or nondisclosure. 9 The Seventh
Circuit found this analysis equally applicable to the anti-fraud provisions of
section 17 of the 1933 Act. I00
Plaintiffs in Sanders also argued that the judgment of the district court
could be sustained on grounds of a violation by Nuveen of Rule 27 of the
National Association of Securities Dealers. That rule requires members of
the association to establish, maintain, and enforce written procedures for the
purchase and sale of securities. 10 1 The Sanders court cited several cases
96. 425 U.S. 185, 210 (1976).
97. 554 F.2d at 795.
98. Id. at 796. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2) (1970).
99. 554 F.2d at 796.
100. Id.
101. Rule 27 of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., provides in pertinent
part:
Written procedures
(a) Each member shall establish, maintain and enforce written procedures which
will enable it to supervise properly the activities of each registered representative and
associated person to assure compliance with applicable securities laws, rules, regula-
tions and statements of policy promulgated thereunder and with the rules of this
Association.
Responsibility of member
(b) Final responsibility for proper supervision shall rest with the members. The
member shall designate a partner, officer or manager in each office of supervisory
jurisdiction, including the main office, to carry out the written supervisory proce-
dures. A copy of such procedures shall be kept in each such office.
Written approval
(c) Each member shall be responsible for keeping and preserving appropriate
records for carrying out the member's supervisory procedures. Each member shall
review and endorse in writing, on an internal record, all transactions and all corre-
spondence of its registered representatives pertaining to the solicitation or execution
of aity securities transaction.
Review of activities and annual inspection
(d) Each member shall review the activities of each office, which shall include
the periodic examination of customer accounts to detect and prevent irregularities or
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finding an implied civil private damage action for violations of the rules of
securities exchanges and associations, 10 2 but stressed that in each such case
there had been a finding that the violation of the rule involved amounted to
fraudulent conduct. 0 3 The Sanders court noted that the district court had
not made any finding of fraud and that as a consequence no implied cause of
action under rule 27 was available. 1°4 The Seventh Circuit's holding with
respect to rule 27 suggests that violations of a dealer association's rules, just
as violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the securities acts, require a
finding of scienter to give rise to implied civil liabilities. Indeed, the
requirement may be even more stringent with respect to the former since the
Seventh Circuit did not discuss, nor even suggest, the possibility that
reckless conduct would be sufficient to support a civil action for damages
based on a violation of such rules.
Finally, the Sanders court considered the final possible basis on which
the judgment of the district court could be upheld-section 12(2) of the 1933
Act. 05 After reviewing the decision of the district court, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the issue of section 12(2) liability had not been passed upon
by that court. The court therefore reversed and remanded the decision for
further findings of fact as to liability under section 12(2), denying defend-
ants' motion for summary reversal. 106
A final decision discussing the recklessness standard under the anti-
fraud provisions of the securities acts is Wright v. Heizer Corp. 107 In
Wright, the plaintiff was a minority shareholder in International Digisonics
Corporation. 10 8 Defendant Heizer Corporation had acquired, through a
series of three financings with IDC involving the purchase by Heizer of IDC
preferred stock and warrants to purchase IDC common stock, a 61% own-
ership interest in IDC's equity. Two Heizer officers also became members
of IDC's Board of Directors. In a fourth transaction, Heizer agreed to loan
$600,000 to IDC which, if not paid at maturity, would become convertible
into common stock of IDC.10 9 At that point, antidilution clauses contained
in the warrants obtained by Heizer in previous financings would be triggered
abuses and at least an annual inspection of each office of supervisory jurisdiction.
554 F.2d at 796 n.12.
102. See S.E.C. v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. deniedsub. nom. McKey v.
Hochfelder, 409 U.S. 880 (1972); Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410
F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
103. 554 F.2d at 797.
104. Id.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
106. 554 F.2d at 798.
107. 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977),: cert. denied, 46.U.S.L.W. 3526 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1978)
(No. 77-814).
108. Hereinafter referred to in the text and footnotes as IDC.
109. At the time of this transaction, due to resignations and absences, there were only four
participating IDC directors, two of whom, as noted, were Heizer officers. 560 F.2d at 243.
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and Heizer would become entitled to shares of IDC common stock, giving it
approximately 85% of IDC's equity. Because the shares required to be
issued to Heizer in such event were more than the authorized .shares of
common stock of IDC, it was necessary to obtain approval from the
common shareholders for a charter amendment increasing the authorized
shares of IDC. l10 This was secured by written consents prepared and
circulated by Heizer and executed by the common shareholders. After the
lawsuit was instituted, in a fifth transaction Heizer made further loans to
IDC, taking as security a pledge of all of the stock of IDC's only valuable
subsidiary. 11 At the time of the pledge, Heizer controlled three of the four
IDC directors. 
1 12
The Seventh Circuit held that full disclosure had not been made with
respect to the solicitation of consents from the shareholders in connection
with the fourth financing." 3 The court further held that because Heizer
controlled the board of directors of IDC at the time of the pledge transaction,
only the independent shareholders were able to safeguard IDC's interests,
and consequently disclosure of the pledge to the board of directors was
insufficient under rule lOb-5. The court reached this holding despite the fact
that at the time of the pledge transaction Heizer did not control the entire
board of directors but only a majority of such directors. The court held that:
Under these circumstances, Heizer was obliged to disclose the
material facts concerning the [pledge] transaction to the indepen-
dent shareholders prior to its consummation. This obligation was
not fulfilled: the shareholders were first informed of the general
terms of the pledge and the reasons therefor two months after the
transaction. Thus, we hold that Rule lOb-5 was also violated by
Heizer's failure to disclose material facts to the corporation in the
fifth transaction. "14
The Seventh Circuit then stressed that in addition to proving this
violation of the disclosure requirements of rule lOb-5, plaintiffs were also
required under Hochfelder to show reliance on material misrepresentations
and scienter. 11' With respect to reliance, the Seventh Circuit first cited the
110. Heizer Corporation, although it held preferred stock and warrants to purchase shares
of common stock, did not actually own any common stock of IDC. Id.
11l. Id. at 245.
112. Id. at 248.
113. Heizer, although it did not control a majority of IDC's Board at the time of the fourth
transaction, "assumed responsibility for the inadequacy of the disclosure when it undertook to
control and supervise IDC's communications to its shareholders." Id.
114. Id. at 249. The Seventh Circuit thus found rule lOb-5 liability in connection with the
pledge transaction even though stockholder approval of the transaction was neither required
nor sought and no statements had been made to any stockholders in connection therewith. The
decision thus appears to parlay a state law requirement for securing stockholder approval to
defend against a charge of self-dealing into an affirmative rule lOb-5 duty to disclose.
115. Id.
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rule pronounced in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States116 that in a rule
lOb-5 case, proof of materiality is sufficient to establish reliance. Because
the common shareholders had the power under state law to veto the fourth
transaction entirely by disapproving the required increase in authorized
shares, failure to disclose the terms of the transaction was clearly material,
and consequently reliance was established.' 17 With respect to the fifth
transaction, since the minority shareholders could have brought a derivative
action in state court to enjoin any breach of Heizer's fiduciary duty to deal
fairly with the corporation with respect to the pledge, the existence of
reliance hinged upon the fairness of the pledge itself. In making such a
determination, the Seventh Circuit ruled that there was a heavy presumption
of unfairness:
Given the obvious risks of unfairness created by the Heizer
Corporation's limited view of its fiduciary responsibility, the pre-
sumption of unfairness [with respect to the pledge transaction]
applied by the District Court was particularly appropriate. As the
Court noted, Heizer's explanations for the pledge did not over-
come that presumption."p
The Seventh Circuit ruled that the pledge was unfair and simply a device to
discourage the pending lawsuit. Consequently, reliance had been estab-
lished." 9
Scienter, the second element necessary to find a violation of rule 1Ob-5
under Hochfelder, was also satisfied in the court's opinion, again using the
recklessness standard developed in Bailey, Sundstrand and Sanders. In
Wright, the court focused on the "objective" element of the two-pronged
test 120 developed in Sundstrand and Sanders, noting that Heizer "must
have been aware" that both the fourth transaction and the pledge were
highly controversial and would arouse opposition on the part of the common
shareholders. 121 Nonetheless, Heizer used consent forms which did not
disclose the controversial aspects of the fourth transaction, and solicited the
consents by having the founder of IDC's business circulate the consents
among his friends who were common shareholders. Since these nondisclo-
sures, as well as the decision by Heizer not to seek shareholder approval of
the pledge, were clearly by conscious choice of Heizer and its counsel, the
court had little difficulty with the second, "subjective" element of the
recklessness test; indeed, that element of the two-pronged test was not even
mentioned in the Wright opinion.
116. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
117. 560 F.2d at 250.
118. Id. at 251.
119. Id.
120. See text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.
121. 560 F.2d at 252.
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A final interesting development posed by the Wright case was the
relief afforded to the plaintiff. The court stated the general rule that in
granting relief "a court of equity should attempt to return the parties to the
status quo ante, unraveling transactions effected through violations of rule
1 Ob-5 to the extent that it may do so fairly and without injuring the rights of
innocent parties." 12 2 The court of appeals then approved the district court's
cancellation of the conversion feature of the loans made pursuant to the
fourth transaction, as well as cancellation of the IDC charter amendment
permitting an increase in the number of authorized common shares. 1 23 The
Seventh Circuit also approved the district court's decision voiding the
pledge, holding that the maturities of the loans extended pursuant to the
fourth transaction should be extended commensurate with IDC's ability to
pay. 124 The court decreed that Heizer should be enjoined from seeking to
collect its loans and from threatening (as Heizer had done in a proxy
solicitation) to put IDC into bankruptcy unless minority shareholders agreed
to a plan of recapitalization favorable to Heizer.125 Finally, the Seventh
Circuit approved an injunction against Heizer to prevent the use of its voting
power or its control of IDC's board to compel any securities transactions not
approved by a majority of the shareholders other than Heizer (unless it could
demonstrate the fairness of the transactions), and also required disclosure by
Heizer to the common shareholders of any material facts concerning future
transactions in securities of or held by IDC.126
The Seventh Circuit's development of a recklessness standard for
liability under rule lOb-5 appears to be entirely consistent with the Supreme
Court's recent admonitions against undue expansion of liability under the
securities laws. As indicated by the Sundstrand and Sanders cases, for
conduct to be classified as "reckless" it must bear a closer similarity to an
intentional act than to an act that is merely "grossly negligent." These
strictures make it highly unlikely that plaintiffs will prevail on rule lOb-5
claims in cases other than those involving conduct by a defendant tan-
tamount to actual fraud. Moreover, the finding of recklessness in Sund-
strand and Wright was heavily colored by the fact that the defendants in
those cases occupied a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship to the plain-
tiffs, imposing upon them a greater duty of disclosure than might otherwise
be the case. Indeed, in Sanders, the only case discussing the recklessness
standard that did not involve a defendant acting in a fiduciary capacity, the
122. Id.
123. d. at 253.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 254-55.
126. Id. at 256.
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court found that the requirements of the recklessness test had not been
satisfied.
DAMAGES IN MERGER SITUATIONS
MILLS V. ELECTRIC A uTo-LiTE Co.
The merger case of Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. 127 involved viola-
tions of section 14(a) of the 1934 Act' 28 and the related proxy solicitation
anti-fraud rule.129 In a lengthy opinion, Judge Swygert developed tests for
determining the existence and extent of damages in merger cases involving
violation of this type, and held that under these tests, the merger at issue in
Mills was a fair one.
Between 1957 and 1962, Mergenthaler Linotype had acquired a 54.2%
interest in the stock of Electric Auto-Lite Company. In 1963, Mergenthaler
attempted to merge itself and Auto-Lite into a new corporation to be called
Eltra Corporation. After a proxy solicitation had secured the necessary two-
thirds vote required for ratification of the merger, the merger became
effective on June 28, 1963.
Plaintiffs, minority stockholders in Auto-Lite, filed suit seeking to set
aside the merger on the grounds that the proxy solicitation materials did not
adequately disclose the fact that the Auto-Lite board of directors was
controlled by Mergenthaler. When the case was first before the Seventh
Circuit, the court of appeals held that the proxy statement was "illegally
deceptive," but held that no showing of causality had been made between
the proxy statement and the consummation of the merger. 130 On appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, reinstated the judgment of the
district court and held that:
Where there has beerr a finding of materiality, a shareholder has
made a sufficient showing of causal relationship between the
violation and the injury for which he seeks redress if, as here, he
proves that the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the particular
defect in the solicitation materials, was an essential link in the
accomplishment of the transaction.' 3'
The Supreme Court also held that since the misrepresentations in the proxy
solicitation materials did not relate to the terms of the merger itself, the
merger did not need to be set aside.132 Plaintiffs were entitled to damages
only if they could show either: (1) a reduction in the earnings or earnings
127. 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3293 (U.S., Oct. I, 1977) (No. 77-
331).
128. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
129. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1977).
130. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1968).
131. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970).
132. Id. at 387-88.
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potential of their holdings; or (2) if such an earnings reduction could not be
determined, unfairness of the merger at the time it was consummated. 33 On
remand, the district court held that although the merger should not be
rescinded, the basic terms of the merger were unfair. 134 The court awarded
damages to plaintiffs in the amount of approximately $1,250,000.
Judge Swygert agreed with the district court's rejection of the reduction
in earnings or earnings potential test as an appropriate measure of damages
under the facts of the Mills case. 135 Turning to plaintiffs' assertion that the
post-merger record of Eltra showed that it had appropriated assets held by
Auto-Lite for its use in other divisions and had siphoned off Auto-Lite's
post-merger earnings, Judge Swygert reasoned that "even if plaintiffs'
assertions are true, they cannot form the basis for an award of damages." 1
36
Judge Swygert stressed that after the merger, former shareholders of Auto-
Lite were shareholders of Eltra and consequently could not be harmed by
transfers of assets between the various subsidiaries and divisions of Eltra.
1 37
Indeed, Judge Swygert noted, the only possible way in which post-merger
earnings would be relevant to a demonstration of unfairness of the merger
would be if the ratio of the post-merger earnings of the Auto-Lite division of
Eltra to those of the Mergenthaler division was excessively high in compari-
son to the exchange ratio, since this would indicate that the value of the
Auto-Lite shares had been substantially underestimated at the time of the
merger. 1
38
Judge Swygert added, however, that a comparison of post-merger
earnings is only relevant if commingling of the assets of the merged
companies has not occurred. In this case, the Seventh Circuit was in accord
133. Id. at 388-89.
134. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., No. 63 C 1138 (N.D. I1. Sept. 12, 1977).
135. Judge Swygert noted that the merger terms called for the minority Auto-Lite share-
holders to receive 1.88 preferred shares of Eltra for each share of Auto-Lite common. A
shareholder of Mergenthaler, on the other hand, received one common share of Eltra for each
common share of Mergenthaler held by him. At the time of the merger, Auto-Lite shareholders
also received a dividend of $2.63 per share, which was 23 cents more than the $2.40 dividend
Auto-Lite common had been paying prior to the merger.
Judge Swygert then observed that the average market value of Eltra preferred was $31.06
per share during the month following the merger, and that as a consequence each minority
shareholder of Auto-Lite had received stock worth $58.39 on the market for each share of Auto-
Lite previously held (1.88 x $31.06 = $58.39). On the other hand, the average market value of
Eltra common stock during the same month was $25.25 per share. Thus, each Auto-Lite
minority shareholder received stock worth 2.3 times as much on the market per share as each
stockholder of Mergenthaler received for each share of Mergenthaler previously held
($58.39/$25.25 = 2.31). The effective exchange ratio, in the court's opinion, was thus 2.3 to I.
552 F.2d at 1241-42.
136. Id. at 1242.
137. Id.
138. In comparing the ten year post-merger earnings of the Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler
divisions of Eltra, Judge Swygert found the ratio to be 4.85, which was considerably higher than
the exchange ratio of 2.31. Id. at 1243.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
with the finding of the district court that "substantial commingling of the
assets and operations of Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler during the period
following the merger" had occurred. 139 Moreover, since there had been a
substantial improvement in the quality of management obtained by Auto-
Lite following the merger, and Eltra had continually underestimated the
expenses of its Auto-Lite divisions during the post-merger period, Auto-
Lite's earnings in fact had been inflated."4 However, even in the absence of
these factors, the Seventh Circuit indicated that post-merger earnings are
never a totally reliable indicator of the fairness or unfairness of a merger:
Even in the absence of commingling, postmerger evidence can
only create a rebuttable inference of unfairness because it is
impossible to know with certainty whether the increase in earnings
of one partner to a merger should have been predictable at the
time the merger took place. In this case the ratio of the earnings
per share of the two companies for the four years prior to and
including 1963 were all at or below the effective exchange ratio of2.31:1.141
Judge Swygert then turned to the second criterion for determining
whether damages were recoverable by plaintiffs: the basic fairness or unfair-
ness of the merger itself. The district court, relying on the comparative
earnings and book values of the two corporations, had found that the merger
terms were unfair and that an appropriate exchange ratio would have been
2.35:1.142
The district court had held that an examination of the market value of
Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler shares prior to the merger was an inappropriate
test of the fairness of the merger because of purchases of Auto-Lite stock by
both Mergenthaler and by Auto-Lite itself, and because of purchases of
Mergenthaler stock by American Manufacturing Company.1 43 The Seventh
Circuit disagreed. First, the court of appeals noted that most of these stock
purchases had occurred prior to a six-month period before the merger, and
that there was no showing of manipulation of stock prices during the period
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1244.
142. Based on this differential of. 10 (i.e., the difference between 2.35 and 2.25, which the
district court had found to be the actual exchange ratio), the district court calculated damages
under a complicated formula based upon the market value of Eltra stock following the merger.
As the Seventh Circuit noted, this calculation involved a certain amount of circular reasoning,
since the market value of Eltra stock was directly related to the actual exchange ratio. Rejecting
this calculation, the Seventh Circuit found that if the differential of .10 was correct, the
appropriate measure of damages was simply a multiplication of that differential by the number
of minority Auto-Lite shares. The result would be the additional number of Eltra shares
required to be issued to the Auto-Lite minority shareholders to make the merger fair. Id. at
1244-45. However, as will be discussed, the Seventh Circuit found that the merger terms were
fair for other reasons. See text accompanying notes 143-152 infra.
143. Id. at 1244.
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immediately before the merger in an effort to secure more favorable merger
terms. 144 More importantly, the price ratio of Auto-Lite to Mergenthaler
stock had remained the same during the time in which such purchases
occurred (1961 and 1962), and during the time when few, if any, of such
purchases took place (1963). Moreover, even if the purchases had an effect,
that effect would be to raise rather than lower the price of Auto-Lite stock.
The Seventh Circuit further noted that during the period immediately prior
to the merger, the ratio of purchases of Auto-Lite stock to the total amount
of Auto-Lite stock traded was greater than the ratio of the purchases of
Mergenthaler by American Manufacturing Company to the total amount of
Mergenthaler stock traded.145 Finally, most of the Mergenthaler purchases
of Auto-Lite stock occurred between 1961 and 1963, while the purchases of
Mergenthaler stock by American occurred prior to 1961.
Since the usefulness of market value as a test of the fairness of the
merger was not reduced by these purchases, the Seventh Circuit next
decided that the appropriate period for calculating the price ratio between
the two corporations' stock was the six months immediately prior to the
merger. 146 The ratio for this six month period was 2:1. Judge Swygert noted
that the reliability of this ratio was not weakened because of Auto-Lite's
high dividends from 1961-1963, since the payment of dividends would tend
to raise rather than lower the value of a corporation's stock. 147 Moreover, by
1961 Auto-Lite's traditional business was eroding and a great deal of market
uncertainty had arisen as to the future of the company. In these circum-
stances, Judge Swygert reasoned that post- 1961 market values were a more
reliable indication of market value at the time of the merger than were earlier
figures based upon a different market view of Auto-Lite's future. 148 Having
found market value to be an appropriate measure of the fairness of the
merger, the Seventh Circuit rejected the other factors on which the district
court relied:
We hold that when market value is available and reliable,
other factors should not be utilized in determining whether the
terms of a merger were fair. Although criteria such as earnings and
book value are an indication of actual worth, they are only second-
ary indicia. In a market economy, market value will always be the
primary gauge of an enterprise's worth . . . . If we were to
independently assess criteria other than market value in our effort
to determine whether the merger terms were fair, we would be
substituting our abstract judgment for that of the market. Aside
from the problems that would arise in deciding how much weight
144. Id. at 1245.
145. Id. at 1245-46.
146. Id. at 1246.
147. Id. at 1247.
148. Id.
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to give each criterion, such a method would be economically
unsound.' 49
Applying this market value criterion to the merger before it, the court
found that the price ratio of 2:1 was well below the effective exchange ratio
of 2.31:1 and that on this basis the merger terms were fair. However, Judge
Swygert pointed out that the minority Auto-Lite shareholders were entitled
to compensation for the synergistic effect of the merger, since the synergism
generated by the merger made the new corporation worth more than simply
the sum of its two constituent parts. 1
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To determine whether adequate compensation had been given for this
synergistic effect, Judge Swygert first looked to the pre-merger value of the
two corporations, based upon average market prices during the first half of
1963. Using the average market value of Eltra shares (both common and
preferred) during the month following the merger, Judge Swygert then
determined the difference between the combined pre-merger value of Auto-
Lite and Mergenthaler and the post-merger value of Eltra, the difference
being some $4,200,000. This increase was attributable, in the court's
opinion, to the synergism generated by the merger.
According to Judge Swygert, fairness required that:
the minority shareholders of Auto-Lite should have received Eltra
stock worth at least as much as the pre-merger market value of
their holdings in Auto-Lite and a share of the synergism produced
by the merger proportionate to the percentage of the combined
pre-merger value of Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler which their hold-
ings represented. ' 5'
Thus, the minority shareholders of Auto-Lite were entitled to approximately
29.3%152 of the $4,200,000 attributable to the synergistic effect of the
merger. Had an appropriate number of shares of Eltra stock been distributed
to reflect this 29.3% factor, the exchange ratio would have been 2.16:1, still
below the actual exchange ratio of 2.31:1.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit determined that while plaintiffs were
entitled to attorneys' fees for that portion of the litigation involving the
establishment of a violation of section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, they were not
entitled to such fees in connection with their attempt to prove damages. The
court held that:
149. Id. at 1247-48.
150. In formulating this test for determining the synergistic effect of a merger, Judge
Swygert followed the analysis outlined in Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate
Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974).
151. 552 F.2d at 1248.
152. The percentage of the combined pre-merger value of Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler held
by the Auto-Lite minority shareholders.
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plaintiffs cannot recover fees and expenses unless they demon-
strate that their work on the issue of damages produced a common
benefit for the former Auto-Lite minority shareholders. Plaintiffs
cannot meet this burden. They have conferred no benefit upon the
class they represent beyond the 'corporate therapeutics' produced
by their showing that the proxy statute was violated, and they
must pay their own fees and expenses for their unsuccessful
attempt to obtain damages for that violation.'53
MISCELLANEOUS DECISIONS
A number of other securities decisions by the Seventh Circuit during
the 1976-1977 term merit some discussion.
In Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. Will, 54 the Seventh Circuit granted a
writ of mandamus requiring the district court to adjudicate rule lOb-5 claims
despite the fact that an identical proceeding was pending in state court.
Plaintiff Calvert alleged that defendant American Mutual Reinsurance
Company had made misrepresentations and material omissions in connec-
tion with obtaining Calvert's participation in American's "multiple line
pool" reinsurance program. On July 3, 1974, American Mutual sued Cal-
vert in an Illinois couft seeking a declaratory judgment that the pooling
arrangement was in full force and effect. On January 10, 1975, Calvert
answered alleging that the agreement was void due to violations of federal
and state securities laws as well as common law fraud. Calvert also filed a
counterclaim in state court for monetary damages based on all of the
grounds asserted in its answer except the rule 10b-5 claims.
On the same day, Calvert also sued American Mutual in federal court,
again seeking both rescission of the pooling agreement and monetary dam-
ages on the same grounds as those asserted in its answer and counterclaim in
state court, except that Calvert also asserted a claim to monetary damages
based upon rule 10b-5. American Mutual\moved to abate the federal action
pending resolution of the state court proceeding and, in the alternative,
moved for dismissal on the ground that the reinsurance pooling arrangement
did not constitute a security.
On May 6, 1975, the district court stayed all claims in Calvert's federal
complaint except that for monetary damages based upon rule lOb-5 .1 5 The
court heard oral arguments on the issue of whether a participatory interest in
the reinsurance pool constituted a security, but had not decided that issue as
of the time of the court of appeals decision. In the meantime, the state trial
court had decided that such participatory interests were not securities, and
153. 552 F.2d at 1250.
154. 560 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3426 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1978) (No.
77-693).
155. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, No. 75 C 103 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 1975).
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that holding had been affirmed by the Illinois Court of Appeals. 156 Despite
repeated motions by Calvert, the district court refused to reconsider its order
staying the federal proceeding and refused to permit interlocutory review of
that order. Accordingly, Calvert petitioned the Seventh Circuit for a writ of
mandamus requiring the district court to adjudicate both the claim for
equitable relief, i.e., rescission of the pooling agreement, and for damages
under the 1934 Act and for an immediate decision with respect to the claim
for damages.
After noting the extraordinary nature of the remedy of mandamus, the
Seventh Circuit stressed that the district court had correctly relied upon the
Seventh Circuit's opinion in Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer.157 In Aetna,
the Seventh Circuit had affirmed the district court's stay of a federal action
under rule 1Ob-5 in deference to state court proceedings involving the same
transaction in which the identical lOb-5 claim was raised as an affirmative
defense. The Seventh Circuit held, however, that in light of the Supreme
Court's intervening decision in Colorado River Water Conservation District
v. United States,'58 the Aetna decision no longer was good law, and,
accordingly, it overruled that decision.
The Calvert court interpreted the Colorado River opinion as holding
that:
only in exceptional circumstances should a federal court dismiss
an action because of the pendency of state proceedings involving
the same issues. Circumstances which might lead to such a dismis-
sal include: (1) the assumption of jurisdiction over a res by the
state court; (2) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; (3)
the inconvenience of the Federal forum; (4) the order in which
concurrent jurisdiction was obtained by the two forums. 59
The court noted that the Supreme Court had stated that "only the clearest of
justifications will warrant dismissal.""6° Judge Swygert observed that the
district court had not dismissed Calvert's federal complaint but had merely
stayed all of its claims except that for damages under rule lOb-5, which it
had then refused to decide. This difference, the court ruled, was immaterial,
and accordingly the Calvert court held that a stay was only permissible
under the "exceptional circumstances" test outlined in Colorado River.' 61
Judge Swygert found no such exceptional circumstances, relying most
heavily on the fact that "the strong federal interest in the regulation of
securities and the grant of exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts to
156. 560 F.2d at 794.
157. 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970).
158. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
159. 560 F.2d at 795.
160. 424 U.S. at 819.
161. 560 F.2d at 796.
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adjudicate claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are compelling
factors which weigh heavily against deference to state proceedings.'
162
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit ordered the district court "to proceed
immediately with Calvert's claim for damages and equitable relief under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.,163
In Glazer v. National Commodity Research and Statistical Service,
Inc. ,164 plaintiff alleged that it and others had deposited funds with the
defendant National Commodity Research and Statistical Service' 65 for the
purpose of purchasing options to purchase commodities futures contracts
from it. Both "put" and "call" options were involved. Such options gave
the plaintiffs the right to either purchase a commodities future contract from
defendants or sell such commodities future contracts to defendants at a fixed
price before a fixed date. Although the court did not mention the test
propounded in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. ,166 the Seventh Circuit held that
there was no expectation of profits to be obtained from the efforts of others
and that consequently the options were not "securities:"
[P]rofit for a purchaser depends on the terms of the option, the
amount of the premium [paid to NATCOM], the course of the
market, and the purchaser's choice of the time to exercise the
option. The profit does not depend on the efforts or skill of
NATCOM. Exercise of an option would call upon NATCOM to
produce and sell to the purchaser a specified commodity future
contract, or to buy one from the purchaser, or, as the parties
suggest, to settle in cash for the purchaser's profit. NATCOM's
ability to perform would depend upon its financial resources.'61
Curiously, the SEC in an amicus brief contended that the interests sold
by NATCOM were securities, although admitting that the offer or sale of
commodities, commodity futures, or bona fide options on commodity fu-
tures did not constitute the offer or sale of securities. The court quickly
rejected this argument:
The foundation of the SEC position appears to be that be-
cause NATCOM represented itself to be a trader in commodity
162. Id.
163. Id. at 797. Although a majority of the judges of the Seventh Circuit did not favor a
rehearing en banc when the opinion in Calvert was circulated, Chief Judge Pell (for himself and
Judges Fairchild, Tone and Bauer) filed a separate statement in which he expressed his
preference for resolving the issues in Calvert under a standard of whether the district court had
abused its discretion in granting a stay of the federal litigation, rather than overruling the Aetna
decision. Judge Pell stated that he believed the Seventh Circuit had been led to the unfortunate
conclusion of overruling Aetna because of its unwillingness to consider Judge Will's stay an
appealable order, despite applicable Seventh Circuit precedent holding such orders appealable.
Id. at 796 n.5.
164. 547 F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 1977).
165. Hereinafter referred to in the text as NATCOM.
166. See text accompanying notes 20-30 supra.
167. 547 F.2d at 393.
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futures, and that representation was allegedly false, and because
the extent to which NATCOM would be able to make good on its
obligations would be limited by NATCOM's success in making
money out of other use of its resources, the purchasers actually
bought an interest in the assets. Plaintiff may well be able to
prove, under its complaint, that NATCOM's false representations
of ability to perform amounted to fraud. We are unable to perceive
how the fact that the purchase of an option was fraudulently
induced transforms the option into a security.'6
In Emisco Industries, Inc. v. Pro's, Inc. ,169 plaintiff I.L. Grossman,
Inc., purchased the assets of a division of defendant Pro's, Inc., and in
partial consideration therefor gave a five-year promissory note for
$114,000. In their complaint, Grossman and its corporate parent asserted
various misrepresentations in connection with the purchase of the division
from defendant. In a motion to dismiss, defendant asserted that the promis-
sory note was not a security and consequently there was no actionable claim
under the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws. Judge Swygert first
observed that although the definition of the term "security" in the 1934 Act
included "any note" other than a note with a maturity of nine months or
less, "not all notes are securities within the meaning of the Act."' 70
The Emisco court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in United
Housing Federation, Inc. v. Forman,171 stating that the Forman opinion
"recognized that a distinction must be made between an investment transac-
tion on the one hand and a commercial or consumer transaction on the other
when construing the term 'security.' "172 Under the "economic reality" test
suggested by Forman and Howey, 173 the Seventh Circuit held that defendant
was not an investor with respect to the note given by plaintiff in exchange
for the assets purchased. Judge Swygert stressed that the note was simply a
"cash substitute" and was in the nature of a loan to plaintiff in order to
finance the purchase of the assets. 174 Moreover, there was clearly no
reliance by defendant on plaintiff's efforts to produce profits under the
Howey and Forman rationale; defendant expected that the note would be
paid regardless of whether plaintiff was able to operate on a profitable basis
the division which it purchased. 1
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Plaintiffs also argued that they were investors with respect to the assets
of defendant which they purchased. As Judge Swygert noted, however,
168. Id.
169. 543 F.2d 38 (7th Cir. 1977).
170. Id. at 39.
171. See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
172. 543 F.2d at 39.
173. See text accompanying notes 31-34 supra.
174. 543 F.2d at 41.
175. Id.
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there was no reliance by plaintiff on "present and future efforts of another to
produce profits. " 176 Indeed, plaintiff planned to itself take over the opera-
tions of the purchased division and whether or not it made a profit depended
solely upon its own efforts.
177
Finally, in Bender v. Crown, 178 the Seventh Circuit rejected what it
termed a "bold and aggressive" attempt to collect legal fees. In Bender, the
plaintiffs were attorneys who had represented opposing stockholders in a
merger application filed with the SEC. As a result of these SEC proceed-
ings, the merger application was abandoned and the minority stockholders
were permitted to rescind the sale of their stock. Plaintiffs claimed that they
were entitled to legal fees from the defendants in this case, who, although
they were minority stockholders of the company, were not represented by
plaintiffs in the proceedings before the SEC.
Plaintiffs had filed suit in New York, alleging a claim to compensation
based upon the increase in value of the stock of the minority shareholders,
whether or not they ever actually rescinded the sale of their stock. That
action had been dismissed by the district court, and the dismissal affirmed
on appeal to the Second Circuit. 179 The Seventh Circuit adopted the Second
Circuit's opinion, and added that the "private attorney general" concept
was inapplicable to the facts of this case, citing the Supreme Court's
decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society'80 that
"[c]ourts are not free to fashion drastic new rules with respect to the
allowance of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in federal litigation
",181
176. In a separate concurring opinion, Judge Cummings (the author of the opinion in
Daniel) stated that if the seller of a business was relying on the purchaser's ability to conduct
the business to insure repayment of the note, or if the purchaser had relied upon seller's
representation as to the conduct of the business, the transaction could be held to have an
"investment flavor." Id. (Cummings, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 41.
178. 551 F.2d 169 (7th Cir. 1977).
179. Grace v. Ludwig, 484 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974).
180. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
181. Id. at 269.
